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I. INTRODUCTION: SALBU'S BIG QUESTIONS
Salbu's "big questions" identify core issues for scholars on bribery and
corruption. Salbu asks: (1) when may it be ethical to pay a bribe, (2)
whether the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act's ("FCPA") provisions on "rou-
tine government action" permit us to distinguish between appropriate and
inappropriate facilitative payments, (3) whether non-governmental organi-
zations ("NGOs") should supplant the role of governments in fighting cor-
ruption, and (4) whether corporate principles can have an impact in the fight
against corruption. Our focus is primarily on the latter question, but en-
compasses all of them. Implicit in Salbu's list is the question of whether a
single magic bullet can be identified as a likely solution to the problem of
corruption, e.g. whether NGOs should "supplant" governmental action. In-
stead of phrasing the question in terms of either-or, we would ask: What is
the appropriate mix of strategies to most effectively combat corruption?
The choice is not choosing between strategies, but finding the right mix of
strategies to capitalize on their synergies and most effectively combat cor-
ruption from all sides. We argue that a portfolio of strategies will be the
most efficient route to conquering corruption. Over time, new strategies
'Vice Dean and Kolodny Professor of Social Responsibility, The Wharton School, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania.. J.D. University of Iowa; Doctoral Candidate, The Wharton School, University of Penn-
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may emerge and the relative importance of strategies will shift within an
anti-corruption portfolio.
Among the current portfolio of strategies, we believe that corporate ac-
tion, both individually and on a coordinated basis, can have a significant
impact on the levels of corruption in international business. In addition,
such an approach can provide a way out of the "routine government action"
problem Salbu identifies. Within the realm of possible corporate strategies
we have proposed a Sullivan-like principles approach which we believe can
constitute an important weapon in the overall anti-corruption portfolio.
Salbu critiques our approach and we respond.
Finally, Salbu's first question on the ethics of paying bribes raises fur-
ther questions about the normative foundations of the battle against corrup-
tion. We argue that a sufficient normative foundation is essential for
success in fighting corruption, and we offer some thoughts on the nature of
adequate normative justification.
II. A PORTFOLIO APPROACH TO COMBATING CORRUPTION
None of the individual strategies discussed by Salbu-the FCPA, the
OECD convention, NGOs, corporate principles and programs-by them-
selves will be sufficient to eliminate corruption. Each has significant limi-
tations. Many have questioned the overall effectiveness of the FCPA.' The
government's enforcement of the FCPA has been spotty, and its deterrence
effect is undocumented, if not undocumentable. As a stand-alone strategy
of even a major economic power it is not likely to overcome the coordina-
tion problems inherent in fighting corruption. Firms from other nations will
pay the bribes and disadvantage those hamstrung by the FCPA. With re-
spect to the OECD convention, these same criticisms apply but in a broader
context. For example, there is the real issue of the effectiveness of a West-
ern legalistic approach across many different cultures.' Likewise, a corpo-
rate principles approach by itself will likely not work.
There is a growing consensus that what is needed is a portfolio ap-
proach. An effective anti-corruption system requires complementary strate-
1 See Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEEL. Rnv. 229 (1997).
2 See Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Har-
mony, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 419 (1999); see also Bryan W. Hustead, Wealth, Culture, and
Corruption, 30 J. INT'L Bus. STUDiES 339, 355 (1999) (arguing that a FCPA-type approach
may work well in countries characterized by masculinity and low uncertainty avoidance, but
may not work in countries characterized by high uncertainty avoidance).
3 See Philip M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization and
Fragmentation, 24 YALE J. INr'L L. 257, 283-285 (1999). Nichols argues that codes of con-
duct are by themselves not sufficient for two reasons. First, bribery is a crime not limited to
corporations, and such codes obviously will only reach corporations. Second, the strong in-
centives to commit bribery may overwhelm a corporation's voluntary code.
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strategies used simultaneously to attack corruption from all angles. Peter
Eigan, Chairman of Transparency International, argues for a triPartite attack
involving the government, the private sector, and civil society. Such an at-
tack requires simultaneous use of criminal laws, the removal of tax deducti-
bility for bribes, reforms in government procurement policies that require
greater transparency, a strong free press, private sector reforms on account-
ing and auditing practices, and other strategies.
The International Chambers of Commerce ("ICC") argues that the bat-
tle against corruption is analogous to the idea of a "tipping point" in the
field of public health.6 Efforts to combat a disease may make little progress
for a long period of time until suddenly the synergy of various efforts mate-
rializes, and the disease is brought under control rapidly. Likewise, in the
battle against corruption, the goal is to find the right mix of anti-corruption
strategies that will bring us to the "tipping point," after which the decline of
corruption is accelerated.
A portfolio approach requires modification of Salbu's questions. Salbu
explicitly focuses on an either-or single bullet approach in his question con-
cerning whether NGOs should supplant government action. An either-or
tone is implicit in other sections of his article, e.g. the limitations of gov-
ernment action versus corporate principles. Our approach necessarily rec-
ognizes the limits of each individual strategy within the portfolio while
seeking to understand their potential synergies and relative roles. In the
next section we discuss the role of corporate action within a portfolio of
anti-corruption strategies.
III. THE ROLE OF CORPORATE ACTION WITHIN A PORTFOLIO OF ANTI-
CORRUPTION STRATEGIES
From our perspective, one of the most important questions that Salbu
raises is the role of corporate action in battling corruption. Salbu asks "can
corporate principles [emphasis added] effectively battle corruption?
' 7
However, his analysis goes well beyond such a limited focus. Referencing
the work of Timothy Fort, Salbu discusses whether corporations can serve
as mediating institutions in the battle against global corruption Salbu's in-
4 See Sahr J. Kpundeh & Irene Hors, Overview to CORRUPTION AND INTEGRITY
IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Sahr J. Kpundeh & Irene Hors eds.,
1998), available at http'Y/magnetundp.org/Docs/efa/corruption.htm (Apr. 1998).
5 See Fritz Heimann, The Synergy between Corporate Codes and GovernmentReforms, in
FIGHTiNG BRIBERY: A CORPORATE PRACTICES MANUAL 86-90 (Francois Vincke et al. eds.,
1999).
6 See id. at 87.
7 See Steven R. Salbu, Transnational Bribery: The Big Questions, 21 NW. J. INT'L L. &
BUS. CITE PAGE (2001).8 id. at CITE PAGE.
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tention is to pose questions, not answer them, so he does not suggest a de-
finitive resolution to this question.
We, however, do have a strong view on this issue. We believe that any
approach that fails to include one of the direct parties to a bribery transac-
tion is doomed to fall short. Although outsiders may be able to provide in-
centives and threats seeking to influence the parties directly involved in
bribes, any purported solution must specifically incorporate the interests
and operating realities of the bribe payers and bribe takers in order to have a
chance of success. Furthermore, if the parties themselves are committed to
change, it is far more likely to occur. Otherwise, adversarial resistance will
overwhelm efforts at reform. It therefore follows that corporate action
should be considered a necessary component of any portfolio of anti-
corruption strategies as business firms constitute the primary group of bribe
payers (i.e., the supply side of bribery).9
Salbu discusses the arguments of Fort and Noone that size may limit
"the ability of institutions to develop and foster community values."' 0 If
this claim is correct, it holds dramatic implications for the battle against
corruption. Large firms are often involved in bribery scandals. The litany
of famous cases over the years has included such names as IBM," Lock-
heed, 12 and Honda.13 They are in the front lines in confronting bribery; and
if they are "naturally" incapable of serving as mediating institutions merely
because of their size, there is probably little hope for a solution to the phe-
nomenon.
We are not convinced that size inherently limits the role of large firms.
Instead, we believe that such firms appear to be well equipped to confront
the issue of bribery. Compared to smaller firms, they have more resources
internally, particularly in the critical areas of internal audit and human re-
sources. They should also have greater access to external professional sup-
port. Most of the Big Five Auditing firms-PricewaterhouseCoopers,
KPMG, Ernst & Young, Arthur Andersen, Deloitte & Touche-provide
consulting services to help firms deal with integrity issues, particularly the
control of illicit payments. The Big Five Auditing firms' clients are typi-
cally Fortune 500 firms. Finally, the very visibility of large firms puts them
in the spotlight. IBM suffered considerable embarrassment when they be-
9 Salbu further inquires whether non-governmental organizations might supplant gov-
ernments in the battle against corruption. Government agents are also direct parties to brib-
ing transactions and must be directly involved in any solutions. NGOs alone cannot
realistically be expected to control the complex phenomenon of bribery.
See id. at PG CITE n.88.
See Calvin Sims, In Argentine Bribery Scandal, an Ex-Executive of I.B.M. Says He Is a
Scapegoat, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 1996, at D6.
12 See Lockheed Pleads Guilty To Bribery Conspiracy; Fim Agrees to Pay $24.8 Million
in Fines, WASHINGTONPOST, Jan. 28, 1995, at Cl.
13 See Thomas W. Dunfee et al., Social Contracts and Marketing Ethics, 63 J.
MARKETING 14 (1999).
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came enmeshed in a bribery scandal in Argentina. On the positive side,
when large firms adopt successful programs, they are transparent to other
firms and provide a leadership example for others to follow. Overall, this
leads to the conclusion that any successful portfolio of anti-corruption
strategies must include the participation of large firms. The following sec-
tion identifies the potential of corporate actions such as codes of conduct re-
lating to bribery and compliance programs and discusses their potential
ability to play a critical role in the fight against corruption.
A. The Role of Corporate Codes
The OECD recently conducted a study of how corporate codes of con-
duct are used to combat bribery. 14 They examined 246 codes issued by in-
dividual firms and business associations.' 5 Twenty-three percent of these
codes directly address bribery and corruption.1 6 This made it the fourth
most commonly cited issue, behind labor relations, the environment, and
consumer protection. Of the codes addressing corruption, one-third contain
only a general prohibition on bribery.1 7 Others provide very detailed de-
scriptions of what employees are allowed to do. The aspects of bribery
covered also vary significantly. Some codes deal only with bribery to pub-
lic officials, while others encompass bribery of private employees. Some
codes prohibit the giving of bribes but remain silent on the issue of receiv-
ing bribes. 8 The authors of the study conclude that there is currently little
consensus among corporations on how to define bribery and what to include
in their codes of conduct to direct the behavior of employees.' 9
Salbu criticizes the use of overly detailed codes of conduct regarding
ethical issues lacking universal consensus. Although Salbu appropriately
recognizes the existence of a general consensus that bribery is wrong, he
finds less consensus on what actually constitutes a bribe, especially across
cultural settings. Salbu argues that corporate codes which rigidly define
bribery for multinational corporations may appear to "belittle the idea of
ethics" or become yet another example of moral imperialism similar to
Salbu's view of the FCPA.20 We agree that any attempt to control bribery
must be sensitive to local traditions. Likewise, any attempt to structure
corporate principles on bribery must allow for flexibility at the level of ac-
14 See Kathryn Gorden & Maiko Miyake, Instilling an Anti-Bribery Corporate Culture, in
OECD, No LONGER BusrNmss As UsuAL: FiGHTNG BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION 185-198
(2000).
15 See id. at 186 (stating that a few of the codes in their sample were from NGOs and in-
ternational organizations).
16 See id. at 187.
17 See id.
'8 See id. at 187-89.
'9 See id. at 187.20 Salbu, supra note 7, at PG CITE.
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tual practice. We cannot expect firms facing diverse market and cultural
environments to follow a unified approach. On the other hand, firms need
to be precise and clear in promulgating their own core standards to employ-
ees.
We advocate that firms delineate precise boundaries for prohibited
conduct within the context of their operations. 21 We realize that philoso-
phers and lawyers may easily quibble over the definitions used, and readily
point out hypotheticals likely to produce counter-intuitive results. How-
ever, that is not an appropriate test for a corporate definition of bribery. In-
stead, the question should be whether the definition is capable of producing
adequate guidance. The ultimate answer lies in the realm of experience as
firms learn whether particular definitions are successful in guiding their
employees through corrupt environments.
The benefits of a clearly articulated corporate definition are two-fold.
First, a clear definition provides a basis for workplace rewards and sanc-
tions. Employees know what is expected of them, while managers have a
basis for discipline and giving raises. Second, written policies made avail-
able for review by other firms and interested stakeholders further the dia-
logue on what constitutes bribery. Over time this should allow a consensus
to emerge that takes into account cultural and industry differences.
This section takes a closer look at how this process may evolve by ex-
amining current efforts by multinational corporations to define bribery, es-
pecially in the gray areas of corruption, which today include facilitation
payments, small gifts, entertainment, and travel expenses.
Facilitation Payments. One of the gray areas in bribery is the issue of
facilitation payments. These are payments made "to induce public officials
to perform their functions, such as issuing licenses or permits. ' '22 These
payments are permitted under both the FCPA23 and the OECD convention.24
21 An example of one firm's attempt to define bribery comes from ENI, the Italian energy
company, which defines bribery as follows: "accepting money, favors or benefits from per-
sons or firms that have, or intend to have, business relationships with ENI ... to pay or offer,
directly or indirectly, money and material benefits of any kind to third parties, whether pub-
lic officers or private individuals, in order to influence or remunerate the actions of their of-
fice. Courtesy objects, such as small presents or hospitality gifts, are allowed only when the
value of such objects is small and does not compromise the integrity and reputation of the
partners and cannot be construed by an impartial observer as aimed at obtaining undue ad-
vantages." Eni, Code of Practice, Business Conduct, at http://www.en.itlenglish/panoram
a/codice/comportamento.htmil.22 See Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Offi-
cials in International Business Transactions, in CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF
FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BusNmEss TRANSACTIONS 12 (Apr. 8, 1998)
[hereinafter Commentaries].
23 For Salbu's full definition of what is allowable under the FCPA, see Salbu, supra note
7, at PAGE CITE n.76.
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Salbu identifies the exception for routine government action in the FCPA as
a major problem area, arguing that the definition provides firms with little
guidance. From an ethical analysis, it may be hard to distinguish between a
small payment to a public official to obtain a business permit and a large
payment to a public official to obtain a government contract.2 Some may
even argue from a "broken windows hypothesis" perspective 26, that the law
should target such facilitation payments as aggressively as higher-level cor-
ruption. Under this hypothesis, the ability of lower level officials to get
away with corrupt behavior would encourage higher level officials to be-
lieve that they can get away with similar behavior, though at a significantly
higher monetary amount and at significantly greater harm to the public.
Further, the proliferation of corruption at lower levels of government pro-
gresses on to higher levels of government, as corrupt officials are promoted
through the system. As a practical matter, however, the OECD recognized
that it would be difficult to get all countries to agree to criminalize facilita-
tion payments, or even if they were criminalized, to enforce the law.27
This, then, is an area in which corporate action needs to complement
governmental response. Through their codes of conduct, firms seek to pro-
vide employees with guidance on what is appropriate behavior. One corpo-
rate code states:
[E]ven though such payments may possibly be expected in accordance with area
customs and legal interpretations, and would confer no improper business advan-
tage on the company, every effort should be made to avoid them... In the event
any such payments are considered necessary, it is imperative that they be cor-
rectly recorded and accounted for on the company's books.28
An industry-wide norm of accurately accounting for such payments
and disclosing them may be one effective means of combating bribery.
While this norm is not a prohibition on facilitation payments, it allows other
corporations, as well as the local government, press, and citizens, to gauge
24 See Commentaries, supra note 22. The OECD recognizes that such payments may be
illegal under the laws of the host country, but questions the appropriateness of criminalizing
such payments by outside countries.
25 See Heimann, supra note 5, at 27. Kaufmann argues that "instead of corruption being
the grease for the squeaky wheels of a rigid administration, it becomes the fuel for excessive
and discretionary regulations." Daniel Kaufinann, Revisiting Anti-Corruption Strategies:
Tilt Towards Incentive-Driven Approaches?, Corruption and Integrity Improvement Initia-
tives in Developing Countries, UNDP-OECD Development Centre, available at http://magne
t.undp.orgfDocs/efa/corruption.htm#4 (Apr. 1998). (As a result, in the long-run, making
these facilitation payments will actually lead to more time dealing with bureaucratic offi-
cials, not less).26 See James Q. Wilson & George L Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and
Neighborhood Safety, 249 THE ATLANTc MorrHLY 29 (Mar. 1982) (where the authors
originally develop the Broken Windows hypothesis in the area of policing).27 See Commentaries, supra note 22.
28Heimann, supra note 25, at 30.
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the level of corruption in the region and potentially spur on necessary re-
forms.
Business Courtesies. Another category of potentially corrupt payments
where consensus appears to be lacking is gift giving, entertainment, and
travel expenses. This is an area that causes significant problems for regula-
tors and business persons-both business persons with good intentions and
those attempting to pay bribes under the guise of an innocent gift. Salbu
criticizes the ICC's guidelines on distinguishing between bribes and gifts.
He suggests that such vague guidelines could actually do more harm than
good. He argues, and we concur, that the ones most likely to work are
those that are carefully considered.
The OECD study on corporate codes found that multinational compa-
nies use a variety of definitions to attempt to define allowable gifts and en-
tertainment expenses. These include, "not excessive in value," "within the
business norm," "not seen as an inducement of business," "does not violate
the law," and "does not damage corporate image." 29 Approximately one-
third of codes that deal with bribery require employees to report giving or
accepting gifts to their superiors, but this reporting is limited to those gifts
that exceed the "business norm.,
30
Our own review of corporate codes finds that some firms are going be-
yond these general definitions. Boeing Corporation's code of conduct pro-
vides an extensive discussion concerning what Boeing employees may
appropriately give to federal regulators. Boeing generally instructs its em-
ployees to know and abide by the laws specifying what federal employees
may legally accept as a business courtesy. Even if a regulatory agent may
lawfully accept a business courtesy, however, Boeing policy may prohibit
such a gift. One example of imposing stricter standards than federal regula-
tions is:
Modest items of food and refreshments, such as coffee and doughnuts, may be
offered to federal executive branch employees in connection with business activi-
ties, provided such refreshments are not part of a meal. Soft drinks and cookies
can replace coffee and doughnuts, but other "light refreshments," such as sand-
wiches, may not be offered to federal executive branch employees.3'
How much progress will these detailed codes provide in reaching an
international consensus on what is an allowable gift? In a previous article,
29 Gordon & Miyake, supra note 14, at 189.
30 See id.
31 Offering Business Courtesies, Boeing Corporation Ethical Business Conduct Guide-
lines, available at http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/aboutus/ethics/pro6.htm (Aug.
21, 1998) (Boeing also provides similarly detailed provisions on what types of courtesies an
employee may accept); see also Acceptance of Business Courtesies, Boeing Corporation
Ethical Business Conduct Guidelines, available at http://www.boeing.com/companofices/ab
outus/ethics/pro8.htm (Aug. 21, 1998); Lockheed Martin, Setting the Standard, available at
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/exeth/htmnIcode/printhtm (July 1999).
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Salbu argues that the subtle differences between what distinguishes a bribe
and a gift from culture to culture make it implausible that a uniform set of
rules can be developed.32 We are also skeptical of any claim that one set of
rules can be developed to define bribery for all contexts and cultural set-
tings. The process we are describing is not simply a matter of translating
"coffee and doughnuts" to the local snack foods of the host country. In-
stead, these codes should be adapted to the local traditions. Detailed codes
of conduct can provide a guide to local traditions and best practices for that
industry and/or cultural setting. Firms operating in the US and dealing with
federal regulators may look to Boeing's code as a guide for their own be-
havior in that environment. This process makes explicit perceived local
norms. These provide mechanisms to develop an understanding of when
local traditions are being followed and when they are being abused to im-
properly to gain favoritism.
For example, in Korea, it is common to give ttokkap ("rice cake ex-
penses") around the major holidays.33 This is a centuries-old tradition that
developed out of notions of hospitality and gratitude. In several in-
stances-some involving former Korean presidents and chaebol heads-the
Korean courts have found that the giving of ttokkap exceeded socially ac-
ceptable limits and amounted to bribery.3 Precisely when ttokkap stops be-
ing a gift and becomes a bribe is unclear, however. Even under the Korean
legal system it is unclear when ttokkap exceeds the realm of traditional gift
giving and enters the realm of bribery.35 In one case, a presidential secre-
tary was convicted based on the receipt of $ 776,000 in bribes. In the case
against him, the police excluded from consideration over $ 2.6 million in
payments made to the secretary by various individuals because they were
considered ttokkap.36
The appropriateness of gifts in certain contexts, such as with ttokkap,
may be detailed in corporate codes with the assistance of other corporations
based on their experiences, local governments, NGOs, and others. As these
codes evolve over time, they may produce consensus standards in a manner
32 See Steven R. Salbu, Are Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery a Viable and Desir-
able International Policy Goal Under the Global Conditions of the Late Twentieth Century?:
Extraterritorial Restriction of Bribery: A Premature Evocation of the Normative Global Vil-
lage, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 223,233 (1999). Salbu argues "there are subtleties in this area that
make it difficult to erect clear, uniform boundaries. The lines between acceptable and unac-
ceptable behavior are drawn differently in different settings. Moreover, in the context of cul-
tural pluralism that continues to pervade the global village, convergence on a single set of
acceptable rules is highly implausible." Id.
33 See Joongi Kim & Jong Bum Kim, Cultural Differences in the Crusade Against Inter-
national Bribery: Rice-Cake Expenses in Korea and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 6
PAC. Rim L. & PoL'Y J. 549, 561-562 (1997).
31 See id. at 567-71.
35 See id.
6 See id. at 569-70.
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analogous to the common law. Through this evolution, rules of conduct
may develop to guide the behavior of all corporations operating in a certain
country, and may provide guidance that is transferable to other countries as
well. In addition, these rules or best practices may be supported by NGOs.
In that case, a general consensus on appropriate conduct may develop in the
same way as is currently happening with norms of appropriate behavior re-
garding business practices affecting human rights and the physical envi-
ronment.37
The fact that corporate codes currently lack consensus on how to deal
with issues of bribery and corruption demonstrates their potential rather
than a major failing. The direction given in these codes reflects the current
understanding of what constitutes a bribe in a particular context. The alter-
native top-down approach to defining bribery is not likely to work. The
necessary experience and knowledge does not exist to adequately draft a
universal code to apply to multinational corporations wherever they do
business in the world. Firms experimenting with the best way to confront
bribery allow for the appropriate evolution of anti-bribery norms for differ-
ent contexts. Obviously, the statement that giving regulators doughnuts is
permissible while giving them sandwiches is considered bribery, is not a
candidate for a universal rule applicable throughout the world. This rule
does, however, provide guidance to other U.S. firms and to multinationals
selling to the U.S. government.
In this manner, codes of conduct provide a necessary knowledge trans-
fer mechanism. In determining how to conduct business in South Africa
during the early 1980s, many CEOs stated that the disclosure of information
under the Sullivan Principles allowed them to learn from the experience of
other companies in working towards desegregation and equal opportunity
for all.31 In a similar manner, companies need to share information on com-
bating bribery to allow the best practices to emerge, whether these are
universal practices (as many accounting practices may be), or practices spe-
cific to a region, culture, or industry.
Corporate Compliance Programs. Success at the corporate level,
however, must go beyond definitions and formal statements or codes. Pro-
grams that simply focus on compliance with external laws are not likely to
have an energizing effect on corporate employees. Merely adopting a
strong compliance program has many limitations.39 Values imposed on the
firm from the outside will not necessarily be seen by members of the firm
as legitimate corporate values. Pulling in values from outside the firm
could even create an adversarial attitude towards those values; "how far
37 See Gordon & Miyake, supra note 14, at 186.
38 See David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption: A Principled Approach:
The C2 Principles (Combating Corruption), 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 593 (2000).39 See Lynn Sharpe Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, HARv. Bus. REv.,
Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 106.
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can we go without technically violating the law" may prevail as an attitude
over "how can we implement an important organizational value?" Lawyers
rather than operating or senior staff management may be in the lead. This
may also give credence to adversarial attitudes toward the rules.
In contrast, the ideal program would be an anti-corruption program
based on a firm culture of integrity.40 Here the focus is on furtherance of
core corporate values that are intolerant of corruption. This broader ap-
proach involves senior management, reaches to all employees, is consistent
with workplace rules and expectations, and is much more likely to be inter-
nalized by employees as a core value they personally respect. It is widely
believed that programs with these characteristics are far more likely to be
successful in eliminating corrupt actions.
Existing corporate anti-corruption programs also reveal significant
variations among firms. A recent study of 151 companies from around the
world 41 found that 78 percent of the companies claiming to have a well-
developed anti-corruption program distributed a statement of their program
to all employees, while 32 percent distributed it to their joint venture part-
ners, 29 percent to vendors and suppliers, and 29 percent posted their state-
ment on their website.42 The content of these statements also varied. Less
than half of these codes' anti-corruption statements clearly acknowledged
that adherence to the policy may result in lost business.43 Less than one-
half of the companies provided training sessions for all employees, 44 and
only one-quarter of the companies provided employees with case study ex-
amples of common ethical dilemmas in international business.45 There was
also variation concerning which company officers are involved in the
development, implementation, and monitoring stages of the program.
46
Ultimately, the key is the role that individual firms can play in a proc-
ess of experimentation, benchmarking and peer influence. When firms,
each in their own context and environment, try different solutions, superior
strategies should emerge over time that will help lead the way to the tipping
point against corruption. It is in the development of such programs that we
expect to see the most significant benefit in the short-term under the C2
Principles. This is an area where standardization of best practices is likely
40 See Ronald E. Berenbeim, Company Programs for Resisting Corrupt Practices: A
Global Study, Conference Board Report # 1279-00-RR (The Conference Board), (2000); see
also Royal Dutch/Shell Group, Dealing with Bribery & Corruption: A Management Primer,
(1999), at http://,vwv.shell.com/royal-en/content/0,5028,25469-50972,00.htm1 (discussing
the efforts at Shell to establish a culture of business integrity).
41 Berenbeim, supra note 40. Approximately one-third of the responding companies were
from Europe, one-quarter from the United States, and one-quarter from Asia.42 See id. at 24.
43 See id. at 25.
4 See id. at 27.
45 See id. at 25.
46See id. at 22.
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to occur most successfully, and NGOs may play a significant role (and
some already are). We turn to these issues in the next two subsections.
B. The Role of Third Party Initiators
Within the portfolio of anti-corruption strategies there is considerable
room for joint action and cross support among complementary institutions
and strategies. Transparency International ("TI") has had a perceptible in-
fluence on the perception of corruption. The annual Corruption Perception
Index ("CPI") and the more recent Bribe Payers Index ("BPI") have helped
establish corruption and bribery as an issue of growing importance in the
global economy.47 TI also provides significant support to help governments
understand the best ways to control corruption in their environment. Atti-
tudes about bribery have changed at the World Bank, the IMF and at many
other centers of influence. Both the World Bank and the IMF have taken
measures to prevent corruption in the programs they finance.48
Organizations such as these can serve as key initiators of corporate ac-
tion. Heimann argues that the "World Bank could do more than anyone
else to accelerate the widespread adoption of corporate codes of conduct., 49
The World Bank could re0uire any firm bidding on a project they finance to
have an acceptable code. In developing effective codes, the Conference
Board and the International Chamber of Commerce are working towards es-
tablishing best practices for corporations. 51 They seek to provide practical
advice for corporate managers to implement successful compliance pro-
grams and draft effective codes of conduct.
C. The Role of the C2 Principles
We now turn to our specific proposal, a Sullivan-like Principles ap-
proach to controlling the supply-side of bribery. The Combating Corrup-
tion Principles (or "C2 Principles") establish certain practices and
procedures for firms to implement to combat bribery and require these firms
to publicly disclose their efforts in this area. As with any anti-corruption
strategy, however, the Principles will have little lasting impact without the
support of government and civil society initiatives, as well as other private
sector reforms.52
What is the role of the C2 Principles within a portfolio of anti-
corruption strategies? A successful anti-corruption system requires corpo-
47 For a discussion of these indexes, see generally Hess & Dunfee, supra note 38.
48 See id.
49 Hiemann, supra note 5, at 89.
"0 See id.
s See Berebeim, supra note 40; Vincke et al., supra note 5.
52 The Caux Roundtable, an international organization of more than 250 business leaders
from over twenty-five countries, has endorsed the C2 principles as a recommended means of
implementing the anti-bribery provision of the Caux Principles for Business Conduct See
Hess & Dunfee, supra note 38.
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rate action, government action, and the involvement of civil society. In
most developing countries, however, the political and economic institu-
tional support for an effective government program may be severely lack-
ing. In such situations, the role of the private sector may be invaluable.
The OECD Development Centre recently organized a conference to investi-
gate the potential of the private sector to combat corruption in developing
countries.14 The conference participants concluded that multinational cor-
porations can be essential players in establishing the necessary political
coalitions to support anti-corruption efforts, can assist in educating the
public on corruption, can compensate for the lack of resources available to
NGOs, and can reduce the need for public expenditures to battle corruption
through their own anti-corruption efforts .55
A corporate principles approach can assist the private sector in many of
these areas. For example, the more firms operating in a certain country that
have adopted the C2 Principles, the stronger the political support for re-
form. The C2 Principles can also work to increase awareness about corrup-
tion and its harms.
We propose an even broader role for the C2 Principles. The
implementation of these principles can play a significant role in the
generation of norms of appropriate conduct surrounding potentially corrupt
behavior, both among multinational firms and within host countries.
Principle Two requires a corporation "to establish a clearly articulated
written policy prohibiting any of the firm's employees from paying or
receiving bribes or 'kickbacks."' Although this allows flexibility for firms
to define "bribes" and "kickbacks," it also requires some action on the part
of the firm. It is not satisfactory to leave the issue of defining bribery to
individual employees exercised on an ad hoc basis. A key part of Principle
Two is the development of a "clearly articulated written policy."
Establishing explicit policies and publishing them for review by local
governments, other corporations, and other stakeholders, allows a full
conversation to develop on the appropriateness of certain actions within a
particular context. Ultimately, a consensus should emerge.
The C2 Principles also allow for anti-corruption norms to spread
throughout distribution channels. The Principles emphasize that firms re-
quire suppliers and distributors to commit to the core firm's anti-corruption
policies. The Conference Board study revealed that only 29% of their fea-
tured "program" companies and 11% of other companies distributed their
5 3 See Irene Hors, Dealing with Corruption in Developing Countries 161, OECD, No
LONGER BUSMNESS AS USUAL: FIGHTING BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION 159-165 (2000).
54 See OECD Development Centre, Fighting Corruption in Developing Countries and
Emerging Economies: The Role of the Private Sector, Conference Proceedings, Washington
DC, (Feb. 22-23, 1999), available at http://Vwwv.dee.org/pdf docs/PNACJ721.pdf.
55 See Hors, supra note 53, at 162.
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anti-corruption statements to vendors and suppliers.5 6 Only 33% of pro-
gram companies and 13% of other companies even had a statement of sup-
plier status with regard to the core firm's anti-corruption policy.5 7 Strategies
such as wide-spread adoption of the C2 Principles should improve perform-
ance in this critical area.
IV. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTION WrrHIN A PORTFOLIO OF
ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIES
Governments are clearly heavily involved in the fight against corrup-
tion. Multinational organizations such as the OECD, the Organization of
American States, the Council of Europe, and the United Nations, have all
taken steps to reduce corruption within their member nations. We would
like to focus on the level of local government action, and especially Hong
Kong as an example of effective governmental action within the overall
portfolio of anti-corruption strategies.
The ICAC and the Fight Against Corruption in Hong Kong. Many
commentators have commended the anti-corruption system in Hong Kong,
which over a period of years has transformed Hong Kong from one of the
most corrupt places in Asia to one of the cleanest. While a mix of anti-
corruption strategies must of course be adapted to the local social environ-
ment, 9 a closer look at the efforts in Hong Kong warrants further attention
as it is likely to provide a model that may be used in other parts of the
world.
Hong Kong's anti-corruption strategy consisted of several characteris-
tics that led to its success.6 0 First, and most importantly, Hong Kong estab-
lished an independent agency-the Independent Commission Against
Corruption ("ICAC")-that operated separately from the police.6' Second,
they targeted all forms of corruption, including high-level and low-level
corruption, private-public corruption, and private-private corruption. Third,
the program required active and constant involvement of the government,
business, and civil society.62
"6 See Berenbeim, supra note 40, at 24.
57 See id.
58 See Heimann, supra note 5, at 87; Hors, supra note 53, at 160-61.
59 See Alan Doig & Stephen Riley, Corruption and Anti-Corruption Strategies: Issues
and Case Studies from Developing Countries, in CORRUPTION AND INTEGRITY IMPROVEMENT
INITIATIVES IN DEVELOPING CoUTnRIs (Sahr Kpundeh & Irene Hors eds., 1998), available
at http://magnet.undp.org/Docs/efa/corruption.htm (Apr. 1998).
60 See Hors, supra note 53, at 160-161.
61 The ICAC was established as a new agency because the traditional institution for com-
bating bribery, the police, was extremely corrupt See Michael H. Weihan, Hong Kong: The
Airport Core Programme and the Absence of Corruption, Transparency International Work-
ingPaper (1999), available at http://www.transparency.de (on file with authors).
62 See Hors, supra note 53, at 160.
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The ICAC was the most unique feature of Hong Kong's anti-
corruption system. Established in 1974,63 the ICAC utilized a three-
pronged attacki 4 First, the Operations Department investigated and prose-
cuted alleged instances of corruption. Second, the Corruption Prevention
Department analyzed the practices and procedures of governmental bodies
and provided recommendations on how to improve their anti-corruption
measures. Third, the Community Relations Department worked to educate
the public on corruption and its harms.6
Is this approach transferable to other settings? Other countries have
also utilized the anti-corruption agency approach to some degree, including
Singapore, Malaysia Botswana, Malawi, South Africa, and Australia, some
with much success. The success in Hong Kong has been exceptional,
however, which may be due in part to its unique situation. For example, the
ICAC had a significant amount of human 67 and financial resources, 6politi-
cal support,69 and Hong Kong was unique geographically as a tightly con-
tained city-state. The success of this model is currently being tested. In July
2000, Bertrand de Speville, the former head of the ICAC, enacted a twelve
month contract to establish anti-corruption reforms and education programs
in Indonesia 7 -- a country that ranked 96th out of 99 countries in the 1999
Corruption Perception Index published by Transparency International. 7'
Corporate action is highly compatible with the anti-corruption ap-
proach in Hong Kong. The ICAC developed a system that attempted to
work with all sectors of society. For example, the ICAC encouraged mem-
bers of society to report instances of corruption.7 - Most recently, the ICAC
6 3 See Max J. Skidmore, Promise and Peril in Combating Corruption: Hong Kong's
ICAC, 547 ANNALs Ac~A. PoL. & Soc. Sci. 118, 122 (1996).
64 See Weihan, supra note 61.
65 The programs range from educating elementary-age school children to developing
training programs for corporations. See Weihan, supra note 61. A goal of this prong of the
attack is to convince people that corruption and bribery is not a customary practice that is in-
evitable. See Fanny Wong, Back to the Future in the War on Graft, S. CHINA MORMNG
POST, Nov. 29, 1995, at 18. In addition, the ICAC seeks to encourage people to report in-
stances of corruption. See id.
66 See Skidmore, supra note 63, at 122; Jeremy Pope, The Need for, and Role of an Inde-
pendent Anti-Corruption Agency, Transparency International Working Paper (1999), avail-
able at http://wwv.transparency.de/documents/work-papersjpope-iaca.html.
67 Ile ICAC has a professional staff of approximately 1350 persons. See Weihan, supra
note 61.
68 See Hors, supra note 53, at 161.
" See id.
7 0 See Kevin Sinclair, Indonesian Graft Task Will Test de Speville to the Limit, S. CHINsA
MORNING POST, July 24, 2000, at 17.
71 See Transparency International, Press Release: New Poll Shows Many Leading Export-
ers Using Bribes (Oct. 26, 1999), available at http://wvv.transparency.de/documents/cpi/cp
i-bpipress-release.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2001).
72 See Wong, supra note 65, at 18.
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and the Securities and Futures Commission in Hong Kong developed a code
of conduct to deal with issues such as gifts and commissions in the financial
industry.73 These efforts support each other and provide for the most com-
prehensive attack on corruption.74
V. ThE NEED FOR AN ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION
STRATEGIES
Some corporate approaches to anti-corruption programs appear to be
purely instrumental and are not based upon any specified ethical founda-
tion. This raises the issue of whether a normative grounding is essential for
any type of anti-corruption strategy. Is such a foundation merely extrane-
ous window-dressing or does it provide essential roots necessary to with-
stand winds of controversy? Salbu recognizes 75 that if "moral distinctions
between corruption and grease become sufficiently blurred," then the very
legitimacy of the grease payments exemption may decline. Thus, norma-
tive foundations are important. More broadly, Sethi and Williams argue
that a major failing of the Sullivan anti-apartheid principles was the lack of
a clear normative foundation. 76 Lacking such a foundation, compromises
and instrumental decisions weakened the principles. Ultimately, they were
renounced by the Rev. Leon Sullivan himself. Sethi and Williams con-
clude that "[a]ny set of principles or framework for corporate conduct must
have a cogent philosophy, i.e. raison d'etre, that transcends the immediate
and direct interests of the current stakeholders. 7 8 We agree.
The alternative to an approach based on a normative foundation is ei-
ther one with no foundation whatsoever, or, more likely, one based on law.
The participants in the Conference Board study felt that a legalistic compli-
ance model was not likely to be an effective model for a corporate anti-
corruption program. 7 9 These companies believed that a connection to the
organization's leaders and core values was essential.
73 See Enoch Yiu, Guide Aims to Uphold Finance Industry Ethics, S. CMINA MORNING
POST, November 3, 1999, at 1. Full text of the code is available on Transparency Interna-
tional's webpage at http://www.transparency.de/documentslsource-booklc/CvK/k5.html.
74 See Heimann, supra note 5, at 90 (arguing that actions in the public sector and private
sector can mutually reinforce each other in bringing us to the tipping point in the battle
against corruption).
75 Salbu, supra note 7.
76 S. Prakash Sethi and Oliver F. Williams, Creating and Implementing Global Codes of
Conduct: An Assessment of the Sullivan Principles as a Role Model for Developing Interna-
tional Codes of Conduct - Lessons Learned and Unlearned, 105 Bus. & Soc. REv. 169
(2000).
77 While a debate on the effectiveness of the Sullivan Principles continues, they did ap-
pear to provide some tangible benefits. See generally Hess & Dunfee, supra note 38.
78 Sethi & Williams, supra note 76, at 184.
79 See Berenbeim, supra note 40, at 7.
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But is a normative foundation for a corporate anti-corruption program
actually possible? In his initial section, Salbu asks whether it can be ethical
to pay a bribe in some situations. In the process, he implicitly discusses the
identification of normative foundations against bribery. Salbu explicitly
discusses deontological and teleological approaches. His analysis implies
that no existing normative framework is sufficient to build an intuitively
correct case for a pragmatic strategy against corruption. He goes on to
question whether or not the law should recognize what he perceives as an
ambiguous status for bribery under the standard ethical theories. We dis-
agree with several points of his analysis.
Salbu's analysis of deontological reasoning fails to adequately treat the
issue of conflicting duties. Moreover, his primary example is unrealistic
from a business perspective and quite remote from the typical commercial
bribes at issue in global business. The payment of a bribe to get donated
food through the lines in a civil war is not a run of the mill business situa-
tion.8 o Furthermore, his example is of a category that might be described as
a Schindler's bribe. It presents an extremis situation in which there are two
or more major conflicting duties. The example is designed so that compel-
ling humanitarian considerations weigh against a policy of not paying
bribes; one either pays a bribe or allows a gross violation of human rights to
occur.
From Salbu's perspective, deontology has no answer to the issue of
conflicting duties. Many deontological philosophers, however, have recog-
nized that duties may be of different classes with higher level duties trump-
ing lower level duties. Kant distinguished between perfect and imperfect
duties. Ross discussed primafacie duties. Thus, many rights or duty-based
approaches anticipate Salbu's criticisms. On the other hand, we share his
skepticism as deontological approaches often break down when one starts
parsing the respective status of duties."1
Salbu also uses a teleological approach. Act utilitarian approaches are
notoriously difficult to apply. Furthermore, they may be subject to a cogni-
tive bias. The self-serving fairness bias is well known. It involves a sub-
conscious tendency to prefer one's own interests in situations involving
extensive ambiguity. For example, a manager who may personally benefit
from paying a bribe may have a tendency to assume facts about likely con-
8' A more realistic business case might involve a firm that does business in China and has
the opportunity to pay a bribe to protect a dissident employee from the Chinese criminal sys-
tem.
81 See Thomas Donaldson and Thomas W. Dunfee, Towards a Unified Conception of
Business Ethics: Integrative Social Contracts Theory, 19 AcAD. MGMT. RaV. 252 (1994);
see also Dunfee et al., supra note 13.
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sequences supporting his own personal gain.82 In addition, these conse-
quences may often be impossible to predict with any certainty regardless of
a bias. Thus, there are circumstances in which both teleological and deon-
tological analyses may produce uncertain outcomes concerning specific acts
of bribery.
Salbu is also correct in noting that there are circumstances in which
teleological and deontological approaches will produce mutually exclusive
results. However, the fact that philosophers may disagree, or that a few
special cases may produce counter-intuitive results, does not mean that an
adequate normative foundation for combating corruption cannot be identi-
fied. First, although differences can be identified, there are many cases in
which the duty-based and consequentialist approaches converge. When a
Chinese official accepts a relatively small bribe to overlook the building
code requirements and a "bean curd" bridge is built which later collapses
killing dozens,83 both approaches would find the action problematic.
Second, there are ethical approaches not discussed by Salbu that offer
great potential for providing a normative foundation for an anti-corruption
strategy. One of the most promising of these is the contractarian approach
to business ethics. Donaldson and Dunfee have proposed an approach that
combines recognition of extant social contracts with a consideration of
manifest universal ethical principles known as hypernorms.84 In their book,
Ties That Bind85, they apply their contractarian approach to the phenome-
non of bribery. They conclude that in most cases, the acceptance of a bribe
violates a microsocial norm specifying the duties of the bribe taker to her
employing body. Further, they argue that in most cases bribery is not an
authentic extant norm in the broader society in which it occurs. Instead, the
practices of a small set of bribe payers and bribe takers are wrongly pro-
jected as a norm of the broader society. The fact that bribes are typically
kept secret is an indication that the practice of bribery is not an authentic
norm of the broader community. Thus, they claim that it is inappropriate to
say "bribery is endemic in Indonesia." Instead, it is only a norm for a sub-
culture within Indonesia, one whose norms cannot prevail against the anti-
bribery norms of the broader society. Finally, Donaldson and Dunfee de-
velop, at length, a strong case that hypernorms condemn bribery.
Salbu discusses the Italian tax mores case which has been a favorite
class room exercise of business ethics faculty for many years. This case
82 See generally, David M. Messick and Max R- Bazerman, Ethical Leadership and the
Psychology of Decision Making, 37 SLOAN MGMT. REv. 9 (1996) (discussing cognitive limi-
tations in ethical reasoning).
83 See John Pomfret, Flimsy Bridges of Qijiang County: Corruption and Incompetence
Causing China's Infrastructure to Crumble, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 1999, at Al 1.84 Thomas Donaldson and Thomas W. Dunfee, TiEs THAT BriND: A SOciAL CONTACTS
APPROACH TO BusiNEss ETHics (1999).85 id.
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raises the issue of whether it is ethical to pay bustarella within the frame-
work of the Italian system. Under the contractarian approach, a first ques-
tion is whether the payment of bustarella by commercialistas is an
authentic norm in Italy. Salbu states that it is.86 That, however, remains an
important question of fact. Yes, it was a norm among tax collectors. But
that does not mean that it was more generally accepted among the populace.
In fact, subsequent to the time period of the case, there was a severe reac-
tion against political corruption in Italy that resulted in the prosecution and
imprisonment of many Italian officials. On the other hand, if Salbu is right
that bustraella is an accepted norm throughout the government and also
Italian society, then the argument can be advanced that Italy has the right to
employ a highly inefficient system for tax collection. So long as the system
does not restrict the ability of the Italian government to provide the neces-
sary social goods for its population, then, if indeed this is their official pol-
icy, it should be given deference. We, however, believe that the system of
bustraella is not an authentic norm for Italian society. A simple test would
be whether the tax collector would be willing to have the payment made
public. We doubt that would be the case.
It is not necessary to specify a single normative foundation to be used
in a procrustean manner by all organizations. Instead, each organization
should develop its own normative approach, one compatible with the or-
ganization's core values. In the same manner that consensus should emerge
in regard to issues such as the definition and scope of bribery, so should one
emerge concerning superior forms of normative justification.
VI. CONCLUSION
The issue of corruption is vitally important. It affects the economic vi-
ability of nation states, 7 endangers the physical well-being of untold thou-
sands,88 and unjustly enriches supremely mendacious individuals.89 Salbu
assists our understanding of the phenomenon by suggesting critical ques-
tions in need of resolution. His final question-can world cultures change
to place decreasing emphasis on patronage-provides a clue to the ultimate
end game. Before there can be major improvements, there must be a dra-
matic change in today's global culture. Whether or not we are comfortable
with the implications, today's culture must be seen as allowing massive
levels of corruption to occur, particularly in societies predominately com-
prised of extremely vulnerable people. We optimistically, and we hope not
86 Salbu, supra note 7.
87 See Robert Frank, For Corporate Leaders in Manila, Economy Can't Survive Estrada,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 6,2000, at Al & A14.
88 See Promfret, supra note 83, at 11.89See Hess & Dunfee, supra note 40.
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naively, believe that there are identifiable beginnings of an important
change in global attitudes.
We have argued that research should be focused on ascertaining the
most effective portfolio of strategies for fighting corruption. All of the in-
struments that Salbu mentions will probably play an important role. We
advocate an important role for the private sector and believe that corpora-
tions are capable of significant influence over the evolution of anti-bribery
norms. Not only can they establish an anti-bribery culture among their own
employees that will directly affect the supply side of bribery, but they may
also act in the political sphere to bring about sanctions against corrupt offi-
cials, as is reputedly happening in the Philippines.9° Assuredly, NGOs may
play an important role, with each making its own unique contribution. The
World Bank and the IMF have powerful levers at their disposal. The threat
of a cut-off of future funds may not only serve as a deterrent to future cor-
rupt payments, but may also initiate investigations to identify those respon-
sible for any sanctions. Organizations such as Transparency International
are limited to conducting and publicizing research, lobbying, and using
moral suasion. Yet, TI, which is in fact a small organization of able and
committed individuals, has been able to have a major impact in this arena.
We suspect that Salbu may ultimately be a neo-Hobbesan 9l seeking some
modern Leviathan capable of forcing an end to corrupt behavior.
Salbu is undoubtedly right in arguing that flexibility is essential in the
fight against corruption. Universalizing the approach of the United States
or that of Singapore, or of Denmark is not likely to work. That is why we
believe that a market like interaction among private firms is likely to help
move us toward the critical tipping point against corruption. Each firm and
society has its own special contexts and constraints that must be considered
in the design of effective strategies. Constructive ideas such as transparent
bidding arrangements, publicizing rankings of bribe paying countries, or us-
ing a Sullivan-like strategy of a large number of global companies jointly
committing to transparent policies, procedures, and principles, must be
tested and vetted. Probably, the most effective weapons against corruption
have yet to be identified. They are likely to come sooner in an environment
in which there is disclosure and open sharing of strategies.
90 See Frank, supra note 87, at Al & A14.
91 See Manual Velasquez, International Business, Morality, and the Common Good, 2
Bus. ETHICS Q. 27 (1992).
